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Abstract
This article examines the ideological position of Indonesia’s political parties in addressing the 
2019 presidential threshold under the open-list proportional representation system. The article 
aims to determine the political cleavage among Indonesian political parties, whether classified 
into the ideological spectrum or the organisational degree. From a methodological standpoint, 
it is qualitative research by employing in-depth interviews and online news collection as a data 
gathering technique. The study’s finding depicts that the ideological cleavage is no longer relevant 
under the open-list proportional representation system because political parties eventually have 
pragmatical orientations rather than ideological considerations. It can be proven that the position 
of nationalist secular parties is not merely in the approval side but also in the denial and dilemma 
sides. Likewise, the position of nationalist Islamist parties can be found on two sides: denial and 
dilemma. This finding verifies that Indonesia’s ideological contestation is waning and inactive 
when political parties cope with power issues. On the contrary, the ideology is revived when it 
deals with religious and tribal affairs. 
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Introduction 
Indonesia is the third-largest democratic 
state of the world after India and the USA 
consisting of multiple religions and multiple 
ethnicities. Based on Geertz’s (1960) framework, 
Indonesian society can be catalogued into three 
variants: abangan (nominal Muslim), santri 
(devout Muslim), and priyayi (aristocrat). 
Therefore, Indonesia applies the multiple party 
system with dozens of parties in each national 
election. Although political parties are the 
vital democratic institution that contributes to 
consolidating the state democracy, Indonesia’s 
electoral system is always changing due 
to the process of seeking the most relevant 
system for Indonesian democratic transitions. 
Although the system is changing, the open-
list proportional representation system has 
remained and been applied in Indonesia since 
the 2009 election until the present. In the recent 
Indonesian political debate, the presidential 
threshold is one of the fascinating issues. 
The presidential threshold conceptually 
is the minimum level of support, which the 
candidate pair needs to earn representation 
(Reynolds & Reilly, 1997, p.88). If such a pair 
cannot collect the support, it is not allowed by 
the applied system to run for the competition. 
In Indonesia, the presidential threshold applied 
for the first time in the presidential election in 
2019. According to the 2017 Election Act, only 
parties having a minimum of 20 percent of 
the parliamentary seats or 25 percent of valid 
vote in the previous election can nominate 
the president and vice president candidate 
pair. Nonetheless, pro and contra still exist 
among political parties. Some concur with the 
presidential threshold, while others reject it.
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The debate of the presidential threshold 
has been taking place since the 2014 election. 
At the time, the Constitutional Court 
judges deliberated in 2013, but they did not 
immediately make a quick verdict, and, in 
turn, the verdict was close to the 2014 election. 
Was the public ever informed about why the 
Court postponed the verdict? What was the 
motive? The answer is that the decision cannot 
be separated from the political situation at the 
time. If the verdict was applied immediately 
in 2013, the presidential threshold would no 
longer have been relevant in the 2014 election. 
The situation could have been unstable due to 
a lot of presidential candidates running to the 
stage.
Broadly speaking, Randal (2006, pp. 
387-388) and Mainwaring (1991, pp. 21-43) 
assume that studying political parties in 
developing countries is commonly connected 
with topics of the party system, institutionalism, 
democratisation, and ideology. On the one 
hand, Ufen (2009, pp.160-161) puts forward that 
parties in Indonesia have good performance. 
They are quite in line with democratic values 
and can participate in free and fair elections. 
The military involvement in parties decreases 
and voters can deliver their alert to parties that 
have disappointing performances. On the other 
hand, Ambardi (2008, p. 327-328) argues that 
the competition among parties terminated after 
the election and followed by the invention of 
a cartel. The cartelised party system’s source 
is the parties’ collective dependence on rent-
seeking to meet their financial necessities. 
Nevertheless, Mietzner (2013, p. 223) is sure that 
not all Indonesian parties are cartelised because 
some parties still have solid ties to civil society. 
In terms of the institutionalisation of 
parties, Tan (2012, pp.154-176), Tomsa (2008, 
p.189), Choi (2010), and Hamayotsu (2011, 
pp.133) hypothesise that the party system 
in Indonesia is feebly institutionalised. 
Nonetheless, in the worldwide trend, Ufen 
(2008b), Hamayotsu (2011), Croissant & Völkel 
(2012), and Mietzner (2013) argue that the party 
system in Indonesia is well institutionalised if 
contrasted to remaining South American and 
Asian countries, the Middle East, and Eastern 
Europe. It designates that, consistent with 
Noor’s (2012, p.2) finding, parties in Indonesia 
have a greater opportunity to maintain cohesion, 
but it is possible for them to be fragmented 
parties if they are feebly institutionalised. 
Fionna (2013, p.187) believes that the parties 
can operate various programs if they are more 
institutionalised. On the contrary, the parties 
are inclined to be ineffective and passive if 
they are less institutionalised. Furthermore, 
Liddle & Mujani (2007, pp. 832-851) postulate 
that Indonesia’s recent democratic situation 
demonstrates that the leadership and party 
ID are more influential on voting behavior 
rather than religious consideration. It is also 
reinforced by Ufen (2009, pp.160) who believes 
that nowadays parties are not social movements 
anymore with their robust link of organisations 
like in the period of the 1950s.
Presidentialised parties are also a 
common trend in Indonesia since the direct 
presidential election in 2004 (Ufen, 2018). It 
can sacrifice the parties’ policy, and, in turn, 
the party organisation will be marginalised in 
inventing the party activities and formulating 
its ideology (Samuels, 2002, pp. 471). However, 
Kawamura (2013, pp. 1-27) puts forward that 
presidentialised parties can happen merely in 
huge parties which have a robust organisational 
structure and have an opportunity to contest 
in the executive election rather than small-
middle parties which are not aggressively 
engaged in the executive election because they 
desire to maximise votes only in the legislative 
election. Thus, Poguntke & Webb (2005, 
pp. 1-22) hypothesise that it is a worldwide 
fact in most democratic countries affected 
by the enlarged ability of parties’ leaders to 
avoid party mechanisms and appeal electors 
immediately. The result is the rise of dictatorial 
leaders. Hence, Ufen (2008a, pp. 5-37; 2009, 
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pp.161-168), Tan (2012, pp.175), and Al-Hamdi 
(2017) postulate that political ideology is feeble 
and claim seven constraints which cause 
the feebleness of ideology: the increase of 
presidentialised parties, the rising intra-party 
dictatorial person, the rampant use of vote-
buying, the absence of the party’s meaningful 
platform, feeble loyalties to parties, cartel-like 
collaboration, and the rise of new elites at the 
local level. 
Different from previous studies, this 
article analyses the response of Indonesia’s 
parties in addressing the 2019 parliamentary 
threshold. The upshot is to prove whether the 
ideology is still robust, vague, or submerged. 
The study’s focus is mapping the political 
cleavage among Indonesian political parties 
in addressing the 2019 presidential threshold. 
With such a map, the difference of position 
of each party can be known. Based on this 
consideration, the article aims to determine 
the political cleavage among political parties 
based on their ideological spectrum and the 
organisational degree. As a considerable 
suggestion, the House of Representatives 
could pay serious attention to the electoral 
justice approach in deciding the presidential 
threshold.
Political Cleavage and Party Classification
In Mair’s (2006, p. 372-373) concept, the 
cleavage is frequently related to belief systems 
like religion or class; thus, there are three 
critical characteristics of cleavage. Firstly, a 
cleavage encompasses a social separation 
like religion, ethnicity, or status. Secondly, it 
includes a shared identity where the cleavage 
is justified on collective identity and issues such 
as workers, farmers, Muslims, Christians, etc. 
Thirdly, it needs to look for an institutional 
expression, whether through a trade union, 
a religious organisation, a party, and the like. 
Randall (2006, pp. 389) and Vassallo 
& Wilcox (2006, p. 415) identify prospective 
cleavages: state and religion, center and 
periphery, urban and rural areas, land and 
industry, or workers and owners. Ambardi 
(2008, p. 35-80) categorises three political 
cleavage patterns in Indonesia: the religious-
secular cleavage, the national-regional cleavage, 
and the class cleavage. The first two pairs of 
cleavages were invented during the colonial 
period. In the meantime, the latter shows the 
conflict between working classes and the one 
created by capitalism during the New Order 
Era when vast industrialisation took place. This 
article intends to examine the religious-secular 
cleavage. 
Pa r t i e s  c a n  b e  c a t e g o r i s e d  i n t o 
various distinctive standards, based on the 
organisational degree, the social and political 
aim, the social classes which they tend to 
represent, the positioning toward the political 
system, or the name that symbolises particular 
social and political aims that the parties want 
to be recognised with (Hofmeister & Grabow, 
2011, p. 20-23). This article categorises parties 
based on two primary considerations. First is 
a social and ideological conviction in post-1998 
by applying the concept of Geertz (1960) on 
abang and santri and Machmudi (2006) of Jemaah 
Tarbiyah because lots of parties institute their 
programs based on ideological orientations. 
Second is the organisational degree, as parties 
invent their programs based on their human 
and financial abilities. In the ideological 
classification, considering various scholars’ 
classifications (Liddle, 2003, p.5; Baswedan, 
2004, pp.672-684; Mietzner, 2013, p.169-176; Al-
Hamdi, 2017, p.80-88) on political parties, this 
study catalogues them into three main groups: 
nationalist-secular, nationalist-Muslim, and 
nationalist-Islamist. According to Al-Hamdi 
(2017), these three groups are categorised as 
nationalist because the first two groups declare 
Pancasila as their ideological foundation. 
Although the latter does not adopt Pancasila 
as its ideological base, it welcomes Pancasila as 
the core values within the party platform. Thus, 
the third group is friendly towards Pancasila. 
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In the degree of organisation, this article 
adopts Feith’s theory (1957, p.61) regarding 
the party classification into three different 
categories. First, major parties, which reach 
the minimum vote of 10 percent in the 2014 
election, such as PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra, 
and Demokrat. Ideologically speaking, these 
four parties are nationalist-secular. Second, 
medium parties, which collect the vote between 
3.5 and 9.9 percent in the 2014 election. PAN, 
PKB, PKS, PPP, Nasdem, and Hanura can be 
included here. Third, small parties. Parties that 
have not gained the minimum parliamentary 
threshold of 3.5 percent in the 2014 election 
but still participate in the 2019 election, they 
are categorised in this group, such as PBB 
and PKPI. New parties established after 2014 
are also part of this group, i.e., Perindo, PSI, 
Berkarya, and Garuda. 
Therefore, this article classifies Indonesian 
political parties into three categories. First is 
nationalist secular. In this category, there three 
kinds of parties: major parties (PDIP, Golkar, 
Gerindra, and Demokrat), medium parties 
(Nasdem and Hanura), and small parties (PKPI, 
Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda). Second is 
nationalist-Muslim, which consisting of PAN 
and PKB. Third is nationalist-Islamist, which 
encompassing PKS, PPP, and PBB. These three 
categories are applied as the analytical framework 
of the study. It can be seen in Figure 1. 
Methods 
This article utilises qualitative method as 
theorised by Denzin & Lincoln (2011, p. 3-4) 
by applying the case study as the research 
approach. According to Creswell (2013, p. 97) 
and Flyvbjerg (2011, pp. 301-302), this article 
conceptualises the case study as the intensive 
investigation that describes one or more 
cases for particular aims within a tied case or 
multiple cases through in-depth data collection 
by gathering various sources. 
In-depth interviews and a compilation 
of news media stories were utilised as data 
gathering techniques (Silverman, 2001, p.83-
144). The in-depth interviews with elites of 16 
political parties were carried out over roughly 
eight months between November 2017 and 
June 2018. One informant was interviewed 
twice. Meanwhile, the collection of news stories 
was conducted before, during, and after the 
field research, namely compiling stories from 
reputable online media. After the data was 
collected, as postulated by Creswell (2013, 
p.179-180), the last step is a four-step analysis: 
reducing data, displaying data, verification, 
and conclusion.
Results and Discussion
This article classifies three parties’ 
distinctive positions in addressing the 
presidential threshold: approval, dilemma, and 
denial. Each party has its own arguments. The 
approval position consists of four parties (PDIP, 
Golkar, Nasdem, and PKB). The dilemma 
position includes PPP, Hanura, and PKPI. 
Meanwhile, the denial side encompasses nine 
parties (Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, PKS, PBB, 
Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda).
Figure 1. The Flow of Analysis 
Source: Compiled by the Author. 
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Four Parties Approve the Presidential 
Threshold
These four parties have a main argument 
that the presidential threshold is more beneficial 
for all parties, not merely for major parties. 
They reject the claim that the presidential 
threshold violates the 1945 Constitution and is 
harming small parties. PDIP is at the forefront 
in supporting the 20 percent of the presidential 
threshold. It puts forward that the 20 percent 
can guarantee that the government earns most 
of the parliamentary support (Arkhelaus, 
2017). Joko Widodo, the PDIP cadre, assumes 
that the 20 percent aim is to guarantee the 
stability of the electoral system for a long-
time period, not merely for every five years. 
Hasto Kristiyanto, secretary-general of PDIP, 
strengthens Widodo’s statement. Kristiyanto 
states that 20 percent is not to establish a single 
candidate, but it can increase the quality of 
democracy and stabilise it for policymaking in 
the future (Swasty, 2017). 
Arif Wibowo, the PDIP cadre, presumes 
that the 20 percent does not mean that PDIP 
is scared of other presidential candidates. It 
denotes that the Constitutional Court’s verdict in 
2013 does not regulate the presidential threshold 
in detail so that it allows the parliament and 
government to formulate the threshold. It 
can be called an open legal policy (CNN 
Indonesia, 2017). Hence, Wibowo postulates 
that the 20 percent is a good commencement 
for the government to create a stable coalition 
and, in turn, the government which adopts 
the presidential system will be more assertive 
in executing its decisions and operating its 
programs (Mursid, 2017a). For PDIP, Wibowo 
continues, the ideological and strong coalition 
should have been built since the beginning to 
have the robust presidential system and the 
simple multiparty. Therefore, the presidential 
threshold is a must. Otherwise, the coalition is 
broken while the government is still working. 
The upshot is that government performance is 
ineffective (CNN Indonesia, 2017).
Yuni Satia Rahayu, secretary of PDIP 
in Yogyakarta, puts forward the opinion that 
mentions the 20 percent is violating the 1945 
Constitution is coming from small parties. For 
her, fighting to win the presidential candidate 
requires a lot of support from parties and the 
parliament. If the presidential candidate has 
no positive encouragement in the parliament, 
it can cause problems for this position. In 
his first administration between 2004 and 
2009, the SBY leadership is evidence that the 
government does not have a good relationship 
with the parliament. Rahayu did not want 
this experience to happen again in the Jokowi 
administration. That is why Rahayu still argues 
that the presidential threshold is essential.1
Furthermore, the former chairperson 
of Golkar, Jusuf Kalla, presumes that the 
threshold of 20 percent is reasonable because 
the previous elections were taking place in the 
right way also. It makes sense for Kalla if small 
parties wish to have a low threshold, and major 
parties tend to reinforce the high threshold 
(Jaramaya, 2017). Thus, John S. Keban, vice-
chairperson of Golkar in Yogyakarta, stresses 
the election is not merely about the presidential 
threshold but also on how the election looks 
for the country’s best leader. If a party has no 
chance to nominate its candidate, it can join the 
party, which has the potency to nominate the 
presidential candidate.2 
The Nasdem party just participated 
in the election once, but it encourages the 
threshold of 20 percent (Viva, 2017) and rejects 
the assumption that the threshold harms 
small parties. According to Johnny G. Plate, 
secretary-general of Nasdem, this percentage 
demonstrates that the elected president has 
robust political power in the parliament. Small 
and new parties can unite themselves with the 
president coalition (Metro TV, 2018). Plate’s 
1 Interview with Rahayu was on 04 December 2017. 
2 Interview with Keban was on 04 December 2017 and 
29 March 2018. 
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argument was backed up by Cornus Dwisptha 
Hekseko, secretary of Nasdem in Yogyakarta.3 
In addition to that, Teuku Taiqulhadi, a member 
of the expert board of Nasdem, assumes that 
the threshold is enough to represent the people 
who vote. 
‘Small parties could join other 
parties to support one candidate 
20 percent,’ Teuku said to Tirto 
(Nathaniel, 2017a).
PKB advocates the PDIP, Golkar, and 
Nasdem’s positions. Agus Sulistiyono, 
chairperson of PKB in Yogyakarta, underlines 
that  there  i s  no  term of  advantaged 
or disadvantaged because if a party can 
perform well, it obtains the people’s support. 
Likewise, Umaruddin Masdar, the PKB cadre 
in Yogyakarta, states that if the presidential 
election has many candidates, voters have 
difficulties recognising them one by one so that 
the 20 percent can help voters to acknowledge 
the small  number of  the candidates. 4 
Nevertheless, although Muhaimin Iskandar, 
general chairperson of PKB, already proposed 
the threshold of 10 percent (Nugraheny, 2017), 
PKB can situate Ma’ruf Amin as the Jokowi 
partner in running for the presidential election. 
The approval of PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, 
and PKB is caused by the fact that they are in the 
same coalition in nominating the presidential 
candidate. Moreover, they tend to restrict the 
emergence of other potential candidates and, 
in turn, can guarantee Jokowi as the elected 
president for a second-term period because of 
the small number of the candidates. In other 
words, they are solid in winning the pair of 
Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amien. 
3 Interview with Hekseko was on 28 November 2017 and 
28 April 2018. 
4 Interview with Sulistiyono was on 20 November 2017 
and 22 May 2018 while Masdar was on 15 December 
2017.
Three Parties Are in the Dilemma Position  
While other parties are in a strong position 
between approval and denial, three parties face 
a dilemma where their cadres have different 
responses. It cannot be separated from the 
situation where PPP has a long-term internal 
conflict, Hanura is scared not to pass the 
parliamentary threshold, but it somehow 
should support the Jokowi coalition, and PKPI 
has no stable internal organisation. 
Some cadres of PPP are in the approval 
position toward the threshold of 20 percent. 
Achmad Baidowi, vice secretary of PPP, said 
that the Constitution Court allows the 2014 
election result for the 2019 election (Septianto, 
2018). Thus, 20 percent avoids the elected 
president from the parliament’s political trap 
(Puspita, 2017). 
‘We did not want the 2019 elected 
president to be held hostage by the 
parliament,’ Asrul Sani, secretary-
general of PPP, said to Antara 
(Jingga, 2017). 
If 20 percent of the presidential threshold 
does not meet the agreement, PPP proposes 
another alternative between 10 and 15 percent 
(Ibrahim, 2017). 
Baidowi and Sani’s opinion is rejected 
by other PPP cadres such as Lukman Hakim 
Saifuddin. Saifuddin even rejects the presidential 
threshold since the 2014 election because he 
argues that the threshold is unconstitutional. He 
underlines that any percentage is not in line with 
the 1945 Constitution in Article 6A, which states 
that political parties, and the election participants, 
have the same right to nominate the president and 
vice president (Akuntono, 10 July 2013). 
‘Article 6A does not mention the 
minimum requirement of seat or 
vote. The Presidential Election Act 
should understand the main value 
of the 1945 Constitution,’ Saifuddin 
said to Kompas (Akuntono, 2013).
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Other PPP cadres strengthen Saifuddin’s 
statement. Syukri Fadholi, the PPP cadre, 
rejects the threshold because it violates the 
1945 Constitution. Fadholi also believes that 
the Election Act seems to be ruined by the 
Jokowi regime. The 20 percent demonstrates 
that the existing regime has a big ambition 
to take over the power and eliminates small 
and new parties. The 20 percent is not in line 
with the people’s interests and real life in the 
democratic state.5 
Hanura is also in a dilemma situation. 
On the one hand, Hanura should back up 
the Jokowi coalition, where the coalition 
agrees with the threshold of 20 percent. On 
the other hand, this party is concerned that 
it cannot pass the parliamentary threshold. 
According to Hasnanto, for the Hanura cadre in 
Yogyakarta, anyone can be nominated if there 
is no threshold, and it is very unsafe. Other 
Hanura cadre in Yogyakarta, Abe Nindito 
Radite, agrees that the 20 percent violates 
the 1945 Constitution so that it is okay if all 
parties have the same chance to nominate their 
presidential candidates.6
The dilemma situation in Hanura is also 
proven by the internal elite conflict in 2017, 
disturbing the party’s solidity and electability. 
Therefore, as Kompas (Tashandra, 2017) and 
Viva (2017) cited, Hanura wanted to eliminate 
the presidential threshold to be zero percent. 
Furthermore, as one of the Jokowi coalition 
parties, PKPI agrees with the threshold of 20 
percent. Although many small parties reject it, 
the party with a military family network still 
supports it (Majid, 2018). Nevertheless, while 
the central board of PKPI agrees with the 20 
percent, some local cadres reject it. Supri Tapir, 
the chairperson of PKPI in Yogyakarta City, 
assumes that the threshold is more beneficial 
5 Interview with Fadholi was on 13 December 2017 and 
26 May 2018. 
6 Interview with Hasnanto was on 03 December 2017 and 
02 April 2018 and Radite was on 04 December 2017 and 
22 May 2018.
for major parties, and the success of PKPI being 
the election participant is part of the reward 
of its approval to the threshold of 20 percent. 
As the cadre in the grassroots, Tapir regrets 
the lousy performance of PKPI due to a lack 
of solidity.7 
The dilemma position suffered by PPP, 
Hanura, and PKPI can be seen from two 
interrelated sides. On the one hand, they are in 
the same coalition with the parties nominating 
Jokowi as the presidential candidate. On the other 
hand, these three parties have an internal conflict 
that is causing two opposing views toward the 
presidential threshold: approval and denial. 
Thus, they are not in solid agreement. 
Nine Parties Concur that the Presidential 
Threshold Violates the 1945 Constitution  
Nine parties reject the presidential 
threshold of 20 or 25 percent. Among them 
are those having the parliamentary seats, 
namely Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, and PKS. 
The remaining are small and new parties 
that fail to reach the threshold: PBB, Perindo, 
PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda. These parties 
principally concur that the 20 percent violates 
the 1945 Constitution, harms small parties, and 
is more beneficial for major parties.
Gerindra is one of the parties which 
believes that the threshold violates the 
1945 Constitution because the presidential 
candidate primarily can be nominated by 
any political parties which were part of 
the election participant. Dharma Setiawan, 
secretary of Gerindra in Yogyakarta, thinks 
that the constitution implies that each party 
can propose its candidate to be the president. 
Nonetheless, Gerindra is not scared of that 
threshold because this competition does not 
depend on the party power but the candidate 
image to the public. In Jakarta, the Anis-Sandi 
case is one of the good examples where the 
party power is not the only driving factor that 
7 Interview with Tapir was on 02 December 2017.
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can win the election. Thus, Gerindra is always 
ready to fight in the electoral campaign.8 
Likewise, Demokrat asks to change the 
threshold to zero percent (Simanjuntak, 2017a). 
Demokrat believes that 20 percent is no longer 
relevant to the 2019 simultaneous election 
(Prasetia, 2017). The Demokrat’s denial is 
based on three considerations: the threshold 
is not in line with the 1945 Constitution, it 
hurts democratic values, and it is not logical 
because the 2019 election is simultaneous while 
the guidance is the previous election. Benny 
K. Harman, the Demokrat politician, who 
originated from East Nusa Tenggara, claims 
that the more the threshold is restricted, it 
makes people more apathetic due to limited 
candidates (Nathaniel, 2017a). 
According to Didi Irawadi Syamsudin, 
Vice Secretary of the Demokrat, if the 2019 
election is an agreement, the threshold of 
20 percent refers to what kind of guidance? 
This is strange. Thus, it is normal if people 
eventually presume that the incumbent is 
scared and wants to eliminate his opponents 
(CNN Indonesia, 2017). The Demokrat cadre in 
Yogyakarta, Heri Sebayang, is in as agreement 
with the other Demokrat politicians who 
believe that 20 percent is castrating mainly 
small parties and preventing them from being 
able to nominate their presidential candidates.9 
PAN strengthens the denial position with 
three arguments. Firstly, if a party can pass the 
election commission (KPU) verification, then 
it should be eligible to nominate its candidate. 
Secondly, the threshold of 20 percent restricts 
citizens’ choices. Thirdly, the threshold seems 
to benefit the single candidate and gets rid of 
other potential candidates. Ahmad Hanafi Rais, 
the Vice General Chairperson of PAN, states 
that his party officially rejects the threshold of 
20 percent because of those three arguments. 
8 Interview with Setiawan was on 06 December 2017 and 
28 May 2018. 
9 Interview with Sebayang was on 18 December 2017.
‘It is impossible if we nominate 
the president in 2019, but we use 
the result of 2014. If this happens, 
the parliament can also use the 
2014 result, and we do not need to 
organise the election again,’ Hanafi 
was annoyed.10 
Zulkifli Hassan, the general chairperson 
of PAN, reinforces Hanafi’s statement. He 
argues that the presidential threshold should 
be removed from the Election Bill because of 
the Constitutional Court verdict No. 14/PUU-
XI/2013 on the 2019 simultaneous election 
between president and parliamentary. If the 
threshold is not removed, Hassan proposes 
that the percentage between the president and 
parliament is similar to logical consideration 
(Simanjuntak, 2017b). 
However, PAN already proposed three 
alternative options regarding the presidential 
threshold. The first option is zero percent (Viva, 
2017). The second option is between 10 and 15 
percent as the middle ground between two 
contrasting factions: the zero percent faction 
and the 20-25 percent faction (Mursid, 2017b). 
Otherwise, PAN follows the government option 
of 20 percent but with quota hare as the vote 
allocation method (Prasetia, 2017). 
Two Islamist parties, PKS and PBB, are 
also refusing the realisation of the presidential 
threshold of 20 percent. PKS rejects it with a 
fourfold argument. First, while new parties are 
emerging, the zero percent of the presidential 
threshold is appropriate by referring to the 
1945 Constitution and the Constitution Court’s 
verdict on the 2019 simultaneous election 
(Tribun, 2017). Second, zero percent aims to 
avoid the hegemony of major parties toward 
the elected president. Third, 20 percent is not 
logical for the simultaneous election. Fourth, 
20 percent is more beneficial for major parties 
and getting rid of small parties. For PKS, such 
a threshold is detrimental to people. 
10 Interview with Rais was on 16 December 2017.
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‘Deleting the presidential threshold 
makes the election is fairer, and all 
parties can propose their candidates,’ 
Tifatul Sembiring, former PKS 
president, said as cited by Tirto 
(Nathaniel, 2017a).
Hence, PKS believes that 20 percent 
tends to benefit a single candidate. According 
to M. Darul Falah, chairperson of PKS in 
Yogyakarta, this is not good for Indonesian 
democracy because citizens can only choose 
between limited candidates. Dwi Budi Utomo, 
secretary of PKS in Yogyakarta, also underlines 
that if there is a potential candidate who is 
not supported by major parties, he/she can 
be advocated for by small parties.11 These 
arguments are strengthened by Hidayat Nur 
Wahid, chairperson of the Syuro Council 
of PKS. Wahid stresses that if the choices of 
candidates are limited, we are afraid, many 
citizens do not want to give their vote (Firdaus, 
2017).
Afterward, PBB is one of the leading parties 
in rejecting the presidential threshold. Yusril 
Ihza Mahendra, the general chairperson of PBB, 
argues that the threshold is unconstitutional 
and violates the 1945 Constitution Article 6A 
point 2 because the legislative and presidential 
elections in 2019 are held simultaneously 
(Hakim, 2017). Mahendra sued based on the 
Election Act Article 222 on the presidential 
threshold consisting of 20 percent or 25 percent 
(Rakhmatulloh, 2017) because this regulation 
harms small parties, including PBB so that 
his party cannot nominate its presidential 
candidate (Fachrudin, 2017).
PBB rejects the threshold that is rooted 
in a twofold consideration: constitutional and 
political interest. The former is based on the 
1945 Constitution Article 6e and 22e so that 
the simultaneous election does not adopt the 
threshold. The latter is because there is no 
11 Interview with Falah was on 23 November 2017 and 28 
April 2018 while Utomo was on 30 March 2018. 
chance for Mahendra to run as the presidential 
candidate in the 2019 election (Firmanto, 
2017). This is contrary to common sense. The 
threshold is not applied when the legislative 
and executive elections co-occur (Saubani, 
2017). Mahendra’s argument is strengthened 
by Ray Sitoresmi Prabuningrat, chairperson 
of PBB in Yogyakarta. Prabuningrat states 
that the 20 percent intends to minimise other 
potential candidates so that there are merely 
two candidates.12 
Although PBB vehemently denies the 
presidential threshold, Mahendra’s position 
is on the Jokowi coalition side. It can be seen 
with his engagement as the lawyer of Jokowi-
Ma’ruf during and after the electoral campaign. 
It causes the PBB position in the 2019 election, 
where mainly Muslim communities disbelieve 
it anymore so that the party failed in passing the 
parliamentary threshold. Thus, the refusal of 
Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, and PKS is affected 
by the fact that they are in a similar coalition 
in nominating Prabowo Subianto, although the 
Demokrat seemingly demonstrated its ‘half-
hearted’ support. Despite part of the Jokowi 
coalition, PBB attempted to strive for Muslim 
interests in rejecting the presidential threshold 
to earn the popular vote. Regarding the denial 
argument of small parties, this article presents 
it further. 
Small Parties Reject the Presidential Threshold 
Due to It Causing Them Harm
Four small parties reject the presidential 
threshold: Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda. 
These four parties are new participants in the 
2019 election. Although three parties are part 
of the government coalition excluding Berkaya, 
they still insist on removing the threshold. 
According to Perindo, if the election is held 
simultaneously, there are no different rights 
between old and new parties participating 
in the legislative and executive elections. 
12 Interview with Prabuningrat was on 02 December 2017.
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All parties have equal rights. Ahmad Rofiq, 
secretary-general of Perindo, argues that his 
party already made a proposal to the special 
committee of the Election Bill regarding 
removing the presidential threshold so that 
zero percent should be eliminated from the Bill 
because there is no percentage. Perindo’s denial 
is supported by the argument that this threshold 
is unconstitutional and only causes major 
parties to re-take over the government (INews 
TV,  2017). Rofiq’s argument was reinforced 
by Nanang Sri Roekmadi, chairperson of 
Perindo in Yogyakarta, who states that there 
is no relationship between the 2014 election 
result and the 2019 election. This regulation 
gives a public impression that the existence of 
a threshold is the forced logic.13 
Similarly, although PSI is part of the 
Jokowi coalition, it assumes that the threshold 
of 20 percent is too high, and new parties cannot 
reach it. According to PSI, if the party already 
succeeded in passing the KPU verification, 
it can nominate its presidential candidate 
(Nathaniel, 2017b). Grace Natali, the general 
chairperson of PSI, believes that the realisation 
of such a threshold merely strengthens the 
oligarchic politics and obstructs citizens’ right 
to elect the best leader (Teresia, 2017). 
‘The 2014 election result is no longer 
appropriate to be the consideration 
to calculate public aspiration in 
the 2019 election because a lot of 
political changes take place during 
five years between 2014 and 2019,’ 
Natali said (Teresia, 2017). 
Sigit Nugroho, chairperson of PSI in 
Yogyakarta, supports Natali’s statement. 
Nugroho states that the presidential threshold 
of 20 percent harms new parties because they 
cannot nominate their candidates.14 
13 Interview with Roekmadi was on 20 November 2018. 
14 Interview with Nugroho was on 30 November 2017.
Afterward, Berkarya and Garuda did 
not want to worry about the presidential issue 
because both are still focused on succeeding their 
parties in the legislative election. Nonetheless, 
Berkarya rejects the threshold because it has a 
different view of politics with Golkar, where 
Golkar is on the Jokowi position while Berkarya 
is on the Prabowo side. More specifically, Prio 
Budisantoso, secretary-general of Berkarya, 
emphasises that although Berkarya focuses on 
succeeding the legislative election first, it also 
campaigns to reject the threshold (MNC 104.6 
Trijaya FM, 2018). 
Likewise, Sunu Tri Waluyo, secretary of 
Garuda in Yogyakarta, puts forward that his 
party has no chance to reject the regulation 
because the parliament decided it. Waluyo 
presumes that his party is new, while the 
regulation was decided in 2014. ‘What can we 
do for that?’ Waluyo said.15 Some considerations 
trigger the rejection of Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, 
and Garuda. First, these four parties share the 
identity as new parties in the 2019 election. 
Second, they need to demonstrate their 
existence to the public by having their own 
presidential candidate. Thus, the threshold 
of 20 percent can harm their expectation to 
nominate their candidate.
The three parties’ distinctive positions 
indicate that non-ideological considerations are 
stronger determinants of the parties’ actions in 
responding to the presidential threshold. It can 
be proven by some facts. First, if PPP, Hanura, 
PKPI, PSI, Perindo, PBB, and Garuda are 
consistent with their position inside the Jokowi 
Coalition, they should be in the approval block. 
Second, from an ideological standpoint, PKS 
and PPP should be in the same position due to 
Islam as their foundation. However, because 
both parties are in a different coalition, it 
causes a dilemma for PPP. Third, the coalition, 
whether the Jokowi Coalition or the Prabowo 
Coalition, is not built ideologically. It was 
15 Interview with Waluyo was on 03 November 2017. 
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strengthened by the fact the Prabowo Coalition 
was wrecked after Gerindra joined the Jokowi 
administration. It could be that PAN desires 
to join the Jokowi cabinet after the internal 
conflict in the 2019 Congress. Thus, although 
pragmatism is part of political parties’ nature 
in gaining power, at least there is a symmetrical 
linkage between ideology, agenda, and actions, 
as was theorised by Budge (1994) and Freeden 
(2013). In other words, there is an unintegrated 
bond between the party’s ideology and its 
actions. 
Conclusion
This article provides three different 
cleavages among political parties in addressing 
the presidential threshold of 20 percent or 25 
percent in the 2019 presidential election. The 
first cleavage is the approval position toward 
the threshold. This is strengthened by mainly 
four parties: PDIP, Golkar, PKB, and Nasdem. 
The second cleavage is the dilemma position 
that takes place in three parties: PPP, Hanura, 
and PKPI. The third cleavage is the denial 
position, which is followed by nine parties: 
Demokrat, PAN, PKS, PBB, Perindo, PSI, 
Berkarya, and Garuda.
From an ideological standpoint, the parties’ 
position in addressing the 2019 presidential 
threshold demonstrates that nationalist-secular 
parties do not block themselves merely in the 
same cleavage. It is also taking place with 
nationalist-Muslim and the nationalist-Islamist 
parties. They are spreading in all positions. The 
approval position consists of nationalist-secular 
and nationalist-Muslim parties, the dilemma 
position encompasses nationalist-Islamist and 
nationalist-secular parties, while the denial 
position contains all kinds of political ideology. 
Although all new parties reject the presidential 
threshold, their denial consideration is not 
ideological but more pragmatic orientations. 
From a theoretical view, this article rejects 
Budge (1994) and Freeden’s (2013) hypothesis, 
positing that the ideology can be manifested 
in the party’s agenda. The article finds that 
the ideology is no longer relevant under the 
open-list proportional representation system 
adopted in the contemporary Indonesian 
election. It indicates that the ideological 
contestation is waning, as there are no notable 
differences among parties’ platforms. This 
article also rejects Mietzner’s (2013) view, 
which argued that Indonesian parties have an 
Table 1. 
Parties’ Position toward the 2019 Presidential Threshold
No Position  Arguments  Parties 
1 Approval 
•	 The stable coalition should be built since the beginning to enter the 
presidential election.
•	 The elected president has a durable power in the parliament. 
•	 It helps citizens to vote for the president due to the small number of 
candidates. 




•	Although these parties reject the presidential threshold, they still approve 
it due to part to the Jokowi coalition. 
•	 Some politicians in each of these parties approve the threshold, while others 




•	 It violates the 1945 Constitution because parties which passed the KPU 
verification principally can nominate the presidential candidate. 
•	 The simultaneous election affects the removal of the presidential threshold. 
•	Zero percent is relevant with the emergence of new parties. 
•	 It restricts people’s choices. 
•	 It is more beneficial to major parties to be more oligarchic. 
•	 It gives an image that Jokowi has a big ambition to retake power. 
Gerindra, 
Demokrat, 
PAN, PKS, PBB, 
Perindo, PSI, 
Berkarya, Garuda
Source: Compiled by the Author. 
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ideological foundation. In contrast, the article 
verifies Ufen (2009) and Al-Hamdi’s (2017) 
thesis, which posit that the political ideology 
is feeble and waning. Therefore, the ideology 
is not applicable when parties address power 
issues. Instead, the ideology is revived when 
parties cope with religious and ethnic issues.
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